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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Slowing the perilous temperature rise of our planet demands ambitious internationally 
coordinated action, but the global community struggles to move on from talk to effective policy 
setting. Nearly three decades have passed since 197 nations agreed on the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, thereby committing to “prevent 
dangerous man-made interference with the global climate system” (European Commission). Yet, it 
is evident that “dangerous interference” with the climate system is far from averted: greenhouse gas 
concentration in the atmosphere is reaching record levels, “locking in the warming trend for 
generations to come” and thus threatening life on Earth through effects like sea level rise, wildfires, 
and extreme weather conditions (World Meteorological Organization, 2019). Indeed, accumulating 
evidence indicates that the international effort to effectively mitigate climate change is failing. 
According to Hovi et al. (2016), a climate agreement would have to “attract broad participation 
among major emitters, obligate the participating countries to cut their emissions considerably, and 
achieve high compliance rates” to be regarded as effective (p. 1). The UNFCCC has clearly fallen short 
of meeting these requirements, given the poor participation rate and limited global emissions 
coverage of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the nationally determined, unenforceable emissions 
reduction targets of the 2015 Paris Agreement (ibid). It is thus crucial to consider new models for 
climate negotiations that could bring about an effective agreement that is long overdue. One 
potential alternative is the club approach.  
Rather than concentrating on unilateral negotiations like those under the UN climate 
convention, a growing literature explores the potential of minilateralism–that is, cooperation 
beginning in smaller groups of countries, or climate clubs (see, e.g. Hovi et al., 2016). For instance, 
the Nobel prize-winning economist William Nordhaus (2020) puts his faith in an approach he calls 
“the Climate Club.” In the model he presents, a coalition of states committed to strong emissions 
reductions would penalize non-participant countries by tariff measures. Other scholars have 
introduced differing proposals, but the central idea in the various climate club schemes is consistent: 
the key to effective cooperation is to incentivize participation and commitment through offering 
benefits to rule-abiding members and/or issuing penalties to non-members (Hovi et al., 2016, p. 3; 
Nordhaus, 2020). The definition of a climate club followed in this paper is thus a group of nations 
that voluntarily commits to taking ambitious climate change mitigation measures and encourages 
membership and compliance through effective incentives. The incentive structure is the crucial 
element that distinguishes the club approach from the UN negotiations. In fact, Nordhaus (2020) 
claims that the failure of the UNFCCC stems from the fact that those agreements are essentially 
“regimes with zero penalty tariffs,” which are shown by “both history and modeling” to “induce 
minimal abatement.” By contrast, a club that would provide net benefits to members who commit to 
the agreed-upon mitigation efforts could offset the countries’ incentive to free-ride on other nations’ 
contributions. Examples of successful club mechanisms in international treaties, such as trade 
agreements or military defense alliances, further point to the potential of the climate club approach. 
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In particular, the World Trade Organization (WTO) emerged from a club of nations with a shared 
ambition to reduce international trade barriers; by providing compliant members access to a low 
barrier market, the club succeed in creating a self-enforcing mechanism by which joining the club 
became more attractive the more members it had (Håkan, 2020, p. 50). It is important to note that 
the minilateralist proposals discussed here are indeed proposals: climate clubs that fit the above 
definition exist so far only on the level of thought. Moreover, this concept of a climate club differs 
pivotally from the existing smaller groups of nations that take action outside of the UN convention, 
which are also often referred to as “climate clubs” but only serve the main purpose of facilitating 
dialogue or implementing specific projects, not generating ambitious emissions reductions 
(Weischer et al., 2012, p. 180). For this paper, a climate club’s potential for leading to effective 
climate change mitigation is essential.   
In this thesis, I conduct a literature review of the scholar work on climate clubs. I examine 
prominent club proposals and analyses of the concept’s potential, intending to discover whether or 
not a minilateral solution could be the answer to the problems of international climate negotiations, 
and if so, what type of incentive structure would be the most promising.  
The theoretical potential of the climate club approach appears to be relatively high. The 
global public good nature of climate change mitigation demands a more robust incentive structure 
to discourage free-riding, and by providing that, a club could indeed succeed in reducing global 
emissions better than the unilateral UNFCCC approach. Simulation models also point to the 
potential of various incentive mechanisms: trade sanctions, side-payments, and a combination of 
club goods and conditional commitments are all shown to be effective under certain conditions. 
Nevertheless, careful design of the club’s structure is needed not only to ensure effectiveness but also 
to increase the political feasibility of the club. The club’s prospective success depends largely on its 
ability to achieve political legitimacy, which would require resolving potential legal and political 
issues, including conflicts with international trade principles and a lack of public support. Perhaps 
the most promising scenario for future climate diplomacy is the one where the climate club would 
coexist as a complementary model to the UNFCCC approach; while the UN convention would 
continue to provide an open, legitimate forum for global negotiations, the club would generate the 
needed ambitious mitigation through effective incentives.    
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the theory behind the supposed 
success of a club approach and delve into the various climate club proposals. The following section 
examines the potential of different incentives as they pertain to club effectiveness and growth. Next, 
I consider the matter of a climate club’s prospective feasibility and relation to the UN climate 
convention. The final section presents the conclusions. 
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2. THE CLIMATE CLUB APPROACH 
2.1 Overcoming the Obstacle of Free-Riding  
Analyzing global climate policy from the perspective of microeconomics helps us understand 
the limited success of past agreements and the promise of the climate club approach. What makes 
international climate negotiations particularly challenging is the public good nature of climate 
change mitigation. Because the benefits of climate stabilization accrue to the whole globe regardless 
of which nation pays the costs of abatement, countries have an incentive to free-ride; by definition, 
free-riding happens when “a party receives the benefits of a public good without contributing to the 
costs” (Nordhaus, 2015, p. 1339). In the case of climate change mitigation, it is in an individual 
nation’s interest to leave the costly emissions reductions to others (ibid). Nordhaus (2020) specifies 
that the majority of the benefits from a country’s emission cuts accrue abroad–even the major 
players, China and the United States, would only gain at most 15 percent of the benefits their 
mitigation efforts would have in total. Similarly, a single country incurs only a small fraction of the 
global costs of climate change, below 10 percent on average (Nordhaus, 2015, p. 1349), which helps 
to explain why mitigation is not as high on the agendas of national governments as it optimally 
should be. Moreover, countries refusing to cut their emissions levels are doing so at the expense of 
future generations who will be forced to pay the costs (ibid p. 1339). As can be seen, nations acting 
in their short-sighted self-interest will not undertake sufficient abatement measures if left to their 
own devices.  
While there are market and governmental mechanisms to ensure efficient levels of public 
good provision on the domestic level, none exist for global public goods such as climate change 
mitigation (ibid p. 1949). This lack of effective solutions stems from the principles of modern 
international law and the “Westphalian dilemma.” The concept refers to the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia, which established that nations have “fundamental right to political self-determination” 
and that states are “legally equal” and “free to manage their internal affairs without the intervention 
of other states.” The Westphalian system essentially ordains all international agreements voluntary, 
since countries’ participation requires their consent. (ibid). Moreover, the UNFCCC negotiations 
include a critical barrier known as the consensus rule, which gives veto power to the least 
enthusiastic party and, needless to say, hinders the formation of an effective international climate 
treaty (Hovi et al., 2016, p. 3). In simple game-theoretical terms, states can be thought of as strategic 
players who maximize their own national welfare and, in the absence of a binding agreement, end 
up not committing to ambitious mitigation efforts (Nordhaus, 2020). This unfavorable outcome can 
be described as a prisoners’ dilemma, where the game ends in a noncooperative equilibrium where 
too little abatement is done (ibid). Here is where the club mechanism comes in: by directly remolding 
the incentives of individual countries to favor stronger mitigation measures, the approach inspires 
hope for effective climate cooperation.  
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2.2 The Theory Behind Climate Clubs   
 The theory behind the minilateral approach begins with the economic definition of clubs. 
Nordhaus (2015) characterizes a club as a “voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from sharing 
the costs of producing an activity that has public-good characteristics” (p. 1340). Furthermore, he 
points out that a successful club must provide its members gains large enough to induce them to 
adhere to its rules to access the benefits of membership (ibid). Besides offering benefits to member 
countries, a climate club might decide to punish non-cooperative nations. These penalties can be 
thought of as “internalization devices” that correct the global externality of climate change 
mitigation, much like regulation or tax mechanisms are used to internalize externalities within 
countries (ibid p. 1349). A literature review by Hovi et al. (2016) extends the analysis back to the 
origins of general club theory. Chiefly, the authors acknowledge the early contributions of Buchanan 
(1965), Wiseman (1957), and Olson (1965), whose works can be categorized by the type of goods their 
concept of a club provided: rival or nonrival, excludable or nonexcludable. To begin with, Buchanan 
defined a club “as a member-owned institutional arrangement aiming to provide a ‘club good,’” 
which he determined to be excludable and non-rival up to a point of moderate consumption level. 
Wiseman on his part focused on rival and excludable (“private”) goods, developing a club principle 
for cost-sharing of public utilities use, whereas Olson studied rival and non-excludable (“common 
pool”) goods. In this four-part framework, climate clubs would fit the fourth class of “public goods,” 
since climate change mitigation is both non-rival and non-excludable. (ibid p. 2).  
Furthermore, Hovi et al.’s paper presents a later scholastic contribution by Prakash and 
Potoski (2007), who differentiate between two types of clubs, “Buchanan” and “voluntary” clubs. In 
a Buchanan club, the club’s primary goal is to produce and allocate club goods, as in a sports club 
whose main function is to provide the needed facilities to the members. By contrast, the primary goal 
of a voluntary club is to provide a public good or another benefit that creates a positive externality. 
While there exist no incentives for free-riding in Buchanan clubs since only the contributing 
members can access the benefits, free-riding can present a notable problem in voluntary clubs. 
Voluntary clubs must thus encourage participation in the production of the public good by offering 
the members exclusive benefits, called “club goods in the wide sense” by Hovi et al. to distinguish 
from Buchanan club goods (termed “club goods in the narrow sense”), or simply “club goods” as they 
are usually referred to in climate club literature and henceforth in this paper. A climate club can be 
considered as a voluntary club since it aims to motivate countries to undertake climate change 
mitigation (a global public good that generates a positive externality) and provides incentives to 
prevent free-riding. (ibid p. 3). In essence, the theory behind the proposed success of a climate club 
boils down to incentivizing countries to become members and abide by the rules of the club in 
exchange for granting them access to benefits of membership or freedom from penalties for 
noncooperation. While scholars formulate their climate club blueprints on this same theoretical 
groundwork, the propositions diverge when it comes to more specific sketches of the clubs. 
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2.3 Different Proposals for Club Design  
 A diverse set of proposals for climate club arrangements emerges in the literature. In fact, 
there exists no single climate club approach, but rather multiple opinions on various questions of 
club design. The first such question has to do with club emergence: in particular, whether the world 
should adopt a “bottom-up” or a “top-down” approach. The more prevalent proposal seems to be the 
bottom-up model, in which cooperation is initiated by a small group of nations (see, e.g. Hovi et al., 
2017, p. 6). This proposal is credited to Victor (2011), who advocates the idea of starting in small 
groups based on the claim that serious progress on emissions control emerges when nations can 
flexibly determine what they “can and will implement at home” (p. 23). By contrast, he argues, 
unilateral treaties not only focus on policies that are outside of governments’ control (namely, 
specific emission targets and timetables as opposed to more practical policy decisions) but also 
encourage nations to “offer only the lowest common denominator” when it comes to ambition. 
Negotiations in smaller groups would also allow governments to more easily agree on complex deals 
on policies and membership benefits, both of which Victor envisions to be contingent on what actions 
the countries’ offer and implement. (ibid). Moreover, he conceptually divides the world into two 
categories: “enthusiastic” and “reluctant” countries. Enthusiastic countries are defined as the 
“engine of international cooperation” who are willing to invest their own resources to emissions 
control, whereas the reluctant nations do not value climate change mitigation as an important 
national target (ibid p. 11). His proposal centers on having enthusiastic countries initiate the club 
formation and create incentives to entice reluctant nations to join (ibid p. 23). Several scholars build 
upon Victor’s approach where cooperation evolves from a small group of enthusiastic countries, Hovi 
et al. among them. Furthermore, Falkner (2016) highlights the theoretical advantages of climate 
negotiations with fewer parties, which would enable faster and more effective bargaining among the 
more ambitious nations, creation of incentives to encourage broader participation, and easier 
enforcement of the commitments (pp. 91–92). Providing membership benefits and imposing 
sanctions would also be less costly to implement in a small group (ibid). By contrast, Nordhaus 
(2015) does not support the idea of starting small. His proposal for a climate club is top-down, 
meaning that the regime’s design is first “optimized to attract large numbers of participants and 
attain high levels of abatement,” and only afterward do countries decide whether or not to join (p. 
1344). Nordhaus validates his approach by bringing attention to the unsuccessful empirical and 
theoretical record of bottom-up alliances for cartels and public goods. Specifically, a finding known 
as the “small coalition paradox” shows that while the level of public good production should 
theoretically rise along with the increase in the number of participants, the opposite happens in 
reality. In fact, studies in environmental economics have “virtually universally” discovered a 
tendency for coalitions to be “either small or shallow,” which results from the free-riding problem 
that presents itself in agreements with many participants. To explain this in the context of climate 
clubs, the difference between the optimized cooperative and noncooperative levels of abatement 
grows as more countries join the coalition, which creates an incentive for an individual member to 
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defect. (ibid pp. 1345-1346). Nordhaus thus concludes that a climate club emerging in a bottom-up 
fashion would result not in an effective agreement, but rather in one with either too few members or 
unambitious goals.  
The second question of climate club design is the matter of what type of mitigation 
commitment the countries should agree on. Here, too, the opinions differ. For one, Nordhaus (2020) 
supports setting an international target price for carbon rather than controlling the emissions 
quantitatively. He presents a number of reasons for why a rule on a carbon price would be more 
promising than a quantitative emissions constraint: First, agreement on a target carbon price would 
enable the equalization of carbon prices everywhere and thus lead to efficient climate change 
mitigation where the marginal costs of abatement were equated across all countries and sectors. 
Second, bargaining about a single price would simplify the negotiations, whereas bargains about 
country-specific emission limits would “likely end up with no limits at all” for the simple reason that 
nations would want low restrictions for themselves and high for others. Third, there exist multiple 
possibilities for achieving a wanted minimum carbon price, including taxes or cap-and-trade 
mechanisms, and hence each country could choose the approach it finds most suitable. (ibid). Håkan 
(2020) agrees with Nordhaus in supporting a carbon price agreement, adding to the reasons that it 
would build on existing institutions (either on tax bureaucracies or on markets for other resources) 
and “provide governments with income and an opportunity to reduce other, distorting taxes” (pp. 
51–52). By contrast, Hovi et al. (2017) propose that countries would agree on an emissions reduction 
target as a fixed percentage of their GDP, deeming prices to be “politically less realistic” although 
“economically more efficient” (p. 6). Victor (2011) has his own views. Partly siding with Nordhaus, 
he claims that diplomacy focused on setting target levels for emissions is an “odd” choice since the 
quantity of emissions depends on many forces beyond direct governmental control, such as on 
relative fuel prices and the state of the economy (p. xxxi). However, he does not suggest bargaining 
about a carbon price target but rather argues that countries should focus on negotiating contingent 
policies, placing more emphasis on the importance of setting realistic, implementable goals and less 
on the question of price or quantity control. (ibid). As can be seen, there is much variation in the 
different versions of the climate club concept. While these questions of club emergence and 
agreement type certainly affect the club’s potential, at the heart of the climate club approach is the 
incentive structure meant to encourage participation and compliance with the club rules. The next 
section enquires into the possible incentives and their impact on the climate club’s expected 
effectiveness.    
 
3. EFFECTIVE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE 
3.1 Determinants of Climate Club Success 
At the core of the climate club approach is a carefully designed set of incentives to deter free-
riding. Since the club’s potential effectiveness depends largely on the efficacy of those incentives, the 
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conditions for the climate club’s success are discussed here. To begin with a reminder, an “effective” 
climate agreement must engage a significant portion of major emitter countries in considerable 
emissions reductions (Hovi et al., 2016, p. 1). For a climate club to make a substantial dent in global 
emission levels, it must be able to attract members and ensure that they contribute with critical 
abatement actions (ibid p. 2). Attaining this requires providing cooperative nations excludable 
benefits large enough to guarantee their commitment to the club rules (e.g., Nordhaus, 2015, p. 
1340). Another, a more practical point highlighted by Falkner (2016) is the need for establishing an 
effective global system for reporting, monitoring, and verification, since preventing shirking by 
countries who might untruthfully claim to obey the club rules would require keeping a reliable check 
on the members (pp. 93–94). Furthermore, the club arrangement would need to benefit each of the 
members, exclude or penalize non-members at a relatively low cost to members, and have stability 
in the sense that no member would want to leave (Nordhaus, 2015, p. 1341). The choice of the right 
incentives, whether they be benefits to the countries that participate or penalties to those who do 
not, is clearly an important concern.  
In fact, scholars have identified conditions for the incentive mechanisms themselves under 
which the climate club can become effective. According to Weischer et al. (2012), the “core question” 
is to recognize the benefits that are most important for countries to be willing to commit to ambitious 
mitigation measures. He outlines four main conditions regarding the club goods that would increase 
the club’s likelihood of success: First, the benefits must be significant, meaning that their perceived 
gains need to outweigh the costs. Second, the benefits have to be exclusive to the members of the 
club, for otherwise there will be an incentive to free-ride. Third, the benefits should be valuable to 
all club members. Fourth, the benefits need to respect international law. (pp. 187-188). Furthermore, 
Hovi et al. (2016) add that providing the benefits to members and denying them to non-members 
should cost the club little to nothing and that the benefits need to be apart from the direct benefits 
of climate change mitigation–that is, they must involve issue linkage (p. 3). The need for non-climate 
benefits stems from the fact that the benefits of abatement cannot be excluded from non-cooperative 
countries (Falkner, 2016, p. 92). In addition to club benefits, there are conditions outlined for 
potential penalties as well. According to Nordhaus (2015), the sanctions imposed on noncooperative 
countries need to have two critical features: they should be both external and incentive-compatible 
(p. 1351). By external, Nordhaus refers to penalties that are linked to a set of payoffs unconnected to 
those of the original game; trade sanctions, for example, would be separate from the payoffs of 
climate change mitigation and therefore external (p. 1344). The second critical point, incentive-
compatibility, means that the penalties should not “penalize the penalizer” as many sanctions do but 
rather impose costs on the non-members and benefit the member countries (p. 1351). A key takeaway 
from this analysis is that thorough effort needs to be put into organizing the climate club’s incentive 
structure, such that it will be in the interest of each prospective member to join and abide by the 
agreed-upon emissions reductions. The rest of the section explores the potential mechanisms to 
change the countries’ incentives, categorized here as club goods, sanctions, or side-payments.   
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3.2 Club Goods  
 Providing exclusive benefits, or club goods, for rule-abiding member countries is a central 
aspect of many climate club proposals. A broad scale of potential club goods has been introduced in 
the literature. One common suggestion is cooperation in technology research and development 
(R&D). For example, participating countries could engage in joint R&D projects and share 
intellectual property rights, fostering the development of low carbon technologies (Hovi et al., 2016, 
p. 3). However, scholars recognize multiple potential problems with having technology collaboration 
as a club good, beginning with incentive incompatibility. The incentives may align unwantedly in 
two ways: For one, it would likely not be in the members’ interest to withhold the R&D results from 
non-members. Secondly, the members might also have a “reverse incentive” not to share intellectual 
property rights after the basic research phase, since low-emission technologies can be “crucial to 
national exports and growth strategies.” Cooperation is also complicated by the fact that a single 
major country or a multinational corporation could develop most such technologies with lower 
transaction costs, which leaves only technologies with very high uncertainties and absolute costs as 
candidates for intergovernmental cooperation (ibid). Moreover, Falkner (2016) points out that 
international collaboration on energy efficiency and green technology is especially difficult for 
several reasons, including the fragmentation of global energy governance and competing policy 
objectives (pp. 92–93). Granted, it seems that the potential of shared technology R&D as a club good 
is rather weak. Other possible benefits also related to the development of a low-emissions economy 
include joint projects and trade in services (Weischer et al., 2012, pp. 189–190). While the former 
could comprise low-carbon initiatives like infrastructure investments or demonstration projects, the 
latter refers to trading services (such as developing, installing, and maintaining of renewable energy 
projects) as well as allowing freer movement of persons across the member nations (and thus helping 
to reduce barriers like strict immigration rules and visa requirements that can impede the migration 
of professionals or students in climate-related fields). In addition to cooperation on low-emission 
technology R&D, projects, or service trading, a climate club could offer membership benefits linked 
to international trade.  
 Potential club goods related to trade could take the form of border carbon adjustments, 
tariffs, or non-tariff measures. Border carbon adjustments would function as a mechanism to combat 
carbon leakage, or transfer of emission-intensive production to countries with more lenient 
environmental regulation, by imposing a fee on certain imports from such countries (Hovi et al., 
2016, p. 3; Weischer et al., 2012, p. 190). As Hovi et al. (2016) explain, border carbon adjustments 
would allow climate club members to protect their domestic producers who would otherwise suffer 
the cost disadvantage in international trade compared with competitors who are not subject to as 
stringent environmental standards (p. 3). Weischer et al. (2012) for their part suggest that exemption 
from the border carbon adjustments, were they implemented internationally, would be the club good 
(p. 190). In addition to border carbon adjustments, scholars have proposed broader trade linkage to 
incentivize club membership. For example, member nations could benefit from reduced barriers to 
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trade, possibly by way of lower or eliminated tariffs on sustainable goods, which would also raise the 
competitiveness of said goods compared with carbon-intensive alternatives (ibid). While access to a 
low-tariff zone could theoretically be an effective club good, this proposal has its issues. Notably, 
imposing higher tariffs on noncooperative nations might be detrimental to the self-interest of the 
members and conflict with international trade law (Hovi et al., 2016, p. 3). These obstacles may not 
be insurmountable, however: Record shows that nations “sometimes seem prepared to accept losses 
from imposing trade sanctions–particularly when they believe sanctions might serve a sufficiently 
important purpose.” In reference to Victor’s (2011) definition of enthusiast countries, it seems 
plausible to assume that enthusiast club initiators might be ready to give up potential trade benefits 
in order to penalize reluctant nations should they refuse to join the club. As for international trade 
law, tariff benefits exclusive to club members seem to violate the international trading system’s (the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, and the WTO) most-favored-nation principle, 
which stipulates that all members must be granted similar benefits without discrimination. 
However, there are three major exemptions to this principle, which could enable the use of tariff 
measures as a club good. That is, the GATT Article XX(g) allows exemptions for the purpose of 
natural resource conservation, while the Article XXIV permits the formation of “free trade zones or 
customs unions that increase internal trade more than they divert global trade.” Furthermore, the 
Enabling Clause (Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries) grants developing countries permission to “prioritize 
development over trade while remaining members of the WTO.” (ibid). Based on the Articles XX(g) 
and XXIV, creating a low-tariff zone for climate club members could be in accordance with trade law 
on the grounds that the tariff measures serve to conserve the environment and increase trade within 
the club more than they divert global trade. Yet, it is worthwhile to consider non-tariff measures that 
could avoid the complications of international trade principles. For instance, club members might 
focus on removing other trade barriers, such as “difficult customs procedures, divergent standards 
and certification rules, and peculiar technical requirements,” which might be even more significant 
than tariffs (Weischer et al., 2012 p. 190). While these “non-tariff barriers” are hard to handle in 
unilateral negotiations because of difficulties in defining and quantifying them, a smaller group of 
nations might succeed in reaching an agreement (ibid). In any case, linking the climate club’s 
incentive arrangement to international trade would require more extensive political and legal 
consideration. Linkage to trade is also proposed as a possible penalty for noncooperative nations. 
Evidently, tariffs can double as a club good and a sanction: on one hand, they benefit the member 
countries that are exempt from them, and, on the other, punish the non-members who are not. 
Before the discussion on trade sanctions, however, it is worth examining the findings of formal 
models on the potential of club goods. 
 A study by Hovi et al. (2017) yields insights on the expected effectiveness of membership 
benefits on climate club emergence and growth. Along with club goods, the authors consider the 
impact of another potential instrument, “conditional commitments:” equivalent to Victor’s idea of 
contingent commitments, conditional commitments are offers whereby countries relate their 
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promised mitigations efforts, dependent on what other nations offer and implement (pp. 4–5). To 
investigate the conditions under which a climate club might succeed, Hovi et al. run numerical 
simulations of how climate clubs might attract more members and thus become more effective in 
reducing global emissions. The agent-based model used is a one-shot sequential game with an 
indefinite number of stages that considers a specific form of climate club, one where enthusiastic 
countries initiate the club and try to induce reluctant nations to participate (as in Victor’s climate 
club approach) and where members must undertake abatement worth at least a percent of their GDP. 
The model considers two mechanisms for club growth: firstly, the club may provide club goods 
exclusive to the members, and secondly, members may offer to strengthen their mitigation efforts 
conditional on new members joining the club. While enthusiastic actors are assumed to participate 
automatically and exit the club only if it generates lower net private benefits compared to the no-
club scenario, reluctant actors will join only if their pay-off as club members is greater than as free-
riders. There are 141 actors (not countries, since the European Union is considered as a single actor) 
included in the model, which utilizes data on these actors’ emissions, GDPs, and climate change 
vulnerability scores. (pp. 8–9).  
The results of the study indicate that club goods and conditional commitments could have 
significant potential in achieving effective coverage of global emissions. In particular, the two 
instruments were shown to effectively induce climate cooperation under a broad range of conditions 
if used in combination, but only under a limited set of conditions if used separately. While it seems 
that the use of club goods without conditional commitments would lead to universal participation 
only under “very optimistic assumptions” regarding the member-only benefits a climate club can 
produce, providing club goods does substantially increase the odds of club emergence even if the 
benefits are more modest. As for conditional commitments, an interesting finding concerning their 
potential role in reducing global emissions is that credible conditional commitments made by 
enthusiastic major emitters can shift the cost-benefit calculations of reluctant countries by reducing 
their indirect mitigation costs and increasing the climate benefits of their abatement efforts (through 
triggering further mitigation efforts by other actors). Another key determinant of climate club 
success is found to be the question of which actors play the role of enthusiast club founders: while 
having the United States and the EU as initiators “greatly increases a club’s prospects,” enthusiasm 
is less needed from China (pp. 20–21). To sum up the insights from Hovi et al.’s study, club goods 
and conditional commitments seem to carry a lot of potential in producing an effective climate club, 
especially if both instruments could be implemented simultaneously and the club initiators were 
large economies controlling a sizable share of the global emissions. Overall, the results indicate that 
substantial enough club goods could incentivize reluctant nations who would otherwise free-ride on 
the contributors of others to participate in a climate club. As far as the work of these scholars is 
considered, it seems that simulation models approximating real-world conditions bolster the 
theoretical argument behind the effectiveness of membership benefits. 
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3.3 Sanctions 
 Besides offering benefits to rule-abiding member nations, imposing penalties for non-
cooperation could have the wanted effect on climate club effectiveness. In fact, Nordhaus’s (2015) 
climate club proposal relies on sanctions as the exclusive incentive mechanism: his main argument 
is that penalizing non-members is necessary to induce participation in agreements with ambitious 
mitigation levels (p. 1347). Nordhaus defines sanctions as “governmental withdrawal, or threat of 
withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relationships” and points out that they should benefit 
the senders and hurt the receivers to be effective. (ibid). He does, however, acknowledge that 
sanctions may not be incentive-compatible in the sense that they impose costs on the senders as well 
(ibid), but as was noted earlier, enthusiastic club members might be willing to accept the loss for the 
sake of the club’s cause. Nordhaus divides sanctions on international trade into two categories: 
carbon duties and uniform tariff measures. Whereas the former are defined as tariffs levied on 
imports in relation to their carbon content, the latter refer to imposing a uniform percentage tariff 
on all imports from non-participant countries. Under carbon duties, imports from non-member 
nations would be taxed at the border to match the domestic (or international target) price, or 
alternatively, the importers would be required to purchase emissions allowances to cover the carbon 
content of imports. Similar to border carbon adjustments, the aim in both cases would be to combat 
carbon leakage, improve competitiveness in the global playing field, and cut down emissions. 
However, studies suggest that carbon duties “are complicated to design, have limited coverage, and 
do little to induce participation.” By contrast, uniform tariffs would be both simpler and more 
transparent, Nordhaus argues, and their primary purpose would be to increase participation in the 
climate club. The rationale behind a uniform tariff is that noncooperative nations cause damage to 
other countries through their total greenhouse gas emissions, not only from “those embodied in 
traded goods,” which would justify the use of a uniform rather than a carbon content specific duty. 
In his Climate Club proposal, Nordhaus settles on a uniform tariff. (ibid pp. 1348–1349). 
 However, scholars have also raised arguments against the use of climate tariffs. For instance, 
Falkner (2016) questions the feasibility of such an approach, highlighting two significant political 
barriers to trade sanctions. Firstly, he claims that sanctions are an “unrealistic tool” for constructing 
an effective climate coalition because reluctant nations would likely react to a punitive tariff not by 
joining the club but by challenging the use of sanctions altogether (p. 93). This is a valid concern, 
given that such tariffs would potentially violate multiple WTO provisions. On the other hand, 
scholars have recognized the issue with international trade law and pointed out that certain GATT 
articles could legitimize the minilateral use of tariffs, as was discussed earlier. Secondly, Falkner 
argues that negotiating an agreement with trade penalties would be particularly difficult and deems 
it unlikely that the leading emitter nations would accede to one, given that most major powers have 
usually opposed strong compliance mechanisms in environmental treaties (ibid). There is also the 
risk of retaliation: nations outside the club might impose retaliatory tariffs, leading to “escalating 
trade wars and protectionism.” However, it can be argued that when balanced against the risks of 
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climate change, the risk of protectionism carries less weight. Moreover, retaliation is not definite, as 
outside nations might be hit harder by a trade conflict than club members. (Håkan, 2020, p. 53). 
Acknowledging the expected complications with his uniform tariff scheme, Nordhaus (2015) extends 
his proposal to include “climate amendments” to international trade law, which would “explicitly 
allow uniform tariffs on nonparticipants within the confines of a climate treaty” as well as “prohibit 
retaliation against countries who invoke the mechanism” (p. 1349). Leaving the analysis of the legal 
and political feasibility of such amendments to others, he points out that requiring them would 
emphasize the exceptionally critical threat of climate change and that the uniform tariff approach 
should not be used for every notable cause (ibid). Håkan (2020) also suggests that the WTO should 
be involved in establishing the legitimacy of climate tariffs (p. 53). In his view, carbon tariffs would 
count as “sanctions against misconduct,” much like tariffs are used to manage other international 
conflicts (ibid). While the legal and political problems of trade sanctions merit thorough 
consideration, there is clearly reason to believe they are solvable.   
As Nordhaus (2015) recognizes, empirical modeling is needed to complement economic 
analysis in order to determine the effectiveness of different climate club coalitions “in the context of 
actual emissions, damages, climate change, and trade structures” (p. 1352). The empirical approach 
he takes for this purpose is a game-theoretical simulation model called the C-DICE, or Coalition 
Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy. The C-DICE model examines coalition 
formation, seeking to determine whether or not countries join high-abatement clubs and to find 
stable coalitions. (ibid.) In other words, Nordhaus investigates whether a climate club with penalty 
tariffs on nonparticipating nations can generate an effective and stable coalition. Under Nordhaus’s 
definition, a coalition is effective and stable if it approaches the global optimum level of abatement 
and if no sub-group can make itself better off by changing its status–in other words, there is a 
coalition Nash equilibrium, which extends the concept of Nash equilibrium for a single country to 
include individual (each country individually), collective (all countries together), and coalition 
rationality (all subsets of the countries) (ibid p. 1346). That is, a climate club in a coalition Nash 
equilibrium would be “stable against any combination of joiners and defectors.” Nordhaus uses an 
evolutionary algorithm to find such stable equilibria, modeling 15 world regions with unique 
mitigations costs and damages from climate change. As mentioned earlier, he tests a mechanism of 
uniform tariffs as a penalty for nonparticipation, varying the tariff rates from zero to ten percent. 
Furthermore, the assumptions made are that penalty tariffs conform with international trade law 
and that retaliation by noncooperative nations is prohibited. The study also assumes that nations 
adopt an international target price as the policy instrument, set equal to the global social cost of 
carbon and ranging from 12.5 to 100 US dollars per CO2 ton. Finally, countries are assumed to 
maximize their national economic welfare, which equals their standard income after subtracting the 
damages from climate change as well as the costs of abatement and trade sanctions (ibid p. 1366).   
What Nordhaus concludes from the results is that sanctions are necessary to induce a stable 
climate coalition that improves on the noncooperative equilibrium, finding this to be true regardless 
of the selection of participating countries. As for the participation rate and efficiency, the results 
 15 
indicate that the level of participation and the average target carbon price increase with the tariff 
rate. Nevertheless, Nordhaus finds that modest trade penalties are enough to generate a coalition 
that approaches the optimal abatement level as long as the global target carbon price stays below a 
certain level. For example, full participation and efficiency would be achieved with tariffs as low as 
two or three percent, if the target carbon price were at its lowest (12.5 USD or 25 USD per ton). In 
that case, it would be in each region’s interest to cooperate because the losses from the tariff penalty 
exceed the costs of abatement. As the target carbon price rises, however, it becomes more and more 
difficult to reach the optimal cooperative level of abatement; for a target carbon price of 50 USD per 
ton, the climate club could attain a 90 percent efficiency with a tariff rate of 5 percent, but a carbon 
price of 100 USD would likely induce only the noncooperative level of mitigation even with higher 
tariffs. The reason behind the difficulty in reaching efficient mitigation with a high social cost of 
carbon is that while the abatement costs rise sharply with the international target carbon price, the 
costs of trade penalties incurred from not cooperating are independent of the carbon price. Thus a 
nation’s “cost-benefit trade-off tilts toward nonparticipation” when the global target carbon price 
increases. (ibid pp. 1367–1368). In conclusion, Nordhaus’s findings support the claim that a 
combination of target carbon pricing and modest trade penalties can induce a stable climate coalition 
with high abatement levels. While his climate-economic modeling provides “insights rather than 
single-digit accuracy” (Nordhaus, 2020), it does reinforce the logic behind the supposed success of 
a climate club that imposes sanctions on nonparticipants.  
3.4 Side-Payments  
 Besides sanctions and club goods, scholars have discussed a third class of possible incentives: 
direct payments for club entry. Side-payments, a common instrument in international 
environmental policy, could make the desired impact on climate cooperation. Also termed financial 
transfers, the payments would be collected from member states and given to non-members in 
exchange for their participation (Sælen, 2016, p. 927). In his 2016 paper on side-payments’ potential 
in building an effective climate club, Sælen reviews important insights from game-theoretical 
literature on the topic. Contrary to the rather recent research on climate clubs, there exists an 
established and extensive literature on the effect of side-payments on international environmental 
agreements. The dominating game-theoretical models can be categorized into two general classes: 
the first is membership models, also called two-stage or reduced-stage games, and the second is 
compliance models, or repeated games. Sælen’s survey focuses mainly on membership models, 
which can be further classified as either cooperative or noncooperative. An essential contribution 
from cooperative game theory is the Chander-Tulkens rule, which stems from a straightforward side-
payment scheme derived by Chander and Tulkens in 1995. The rule indicates that a scheme where 
all nations receive payments equal to the increase in their abatement costs from the noncooperative 
to the socially optimal equilibrium and contribute to the total side-payments according to their share 
of mitigation benefits (marginal damage cost divided by the total marginal damage cost) upholds 
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universal participation when the countries are heterogeneous. However, such sharing rules might 
result in inequitable and thus “politically unrealistic predictions” regarding poorer countries that, 
being generally more vulnerable to global warming, end up bearing a disproportionately large share 
of the effort and even compensating the rich. Some proposed schemes take fairness concerns into 
account, including the model developed by Sælen, which prohibits transfers from a poorer to a 
wealthier country. Cooperative models have also faced criticism for assuming too strongly that 
countries believe that the entire coalition would dissolve should they unilaterally withdraw, which 
amounts to unconvincingly severe punishment for nonparticipation. In contrast, noncooperative 
game-theoretical models build on a concept of internal and external stability from the study on cartel 
formation in oligopolies, which does not assume absolute coalition dissolution in reaction to 
individual withdrawal. A key result from this strand of literature is the “small coalition paradox,” as 
Nordhaus (2015) calls the finding that shows coalitions’ tendency to be “either narrow and deep or 
broad and shallow.” As for side-payments, noncooperative models reach the same general conclusion 
as cooperative ones: side-payments can increase participation and abatement as long as the 
countries are heterogeneous. However, the membership models fail to address compliance with the 
agreed climate club commitments. Sælen points out two potential compliance issues with side-
payments, the first being between donors and recipients and the second among donors. For one, it 
might be possible for a recipient to access the payment without taking the agreed mitigation action, 
or for it to take the action and not receive payment. The potential problem among the contributors 
is an incentive to free-ride on the donations of others: if this were the case, the club mechanism 
would simply transform the free-riding problem from abatement to side-payment contribution. 
Indeed, research indicates that noncompliance would benefit donors both through lesser mitigation 
and avoided side-payments, and thus a club with side-payments would need a “stronger deterrent 
against free-riding.” On the other hand, defecting recipients would benefit from evading costly 
abatement measures but suffer from losing future side-payments, which makes side-payments an 
“ideal instrument to credibly sanction developing countries.” (ibid pp. 912–914). Based on this 
review of game-theoretical literature on side-payments, it seems that financial transfers could at 
least theoretically generate an effective climate club if only certain conditions were met, such as 
heterogeneity of countries. Considering that countries do not have identical GDPs and emission 
levels, side-payments should, in theory, be a potential instrument for a climate-club.    
Building on this background of research, Sælen (2016) employs an agent-based model to 
quantify the expected effect of monetary side-payments on climate collaboration and the extent of 
the transfers required (p. 911). He follows Victor’s (2011) climate club model of enthusiastic and 
reluctant countries, assuming that a small group of enthusiastic nations incentivizes reluctant 
nations to join through side-payments (p. 911). Sælen’s model is a one-shot sequential game of an  
indefinite number of stages that searches for potential side-payments deals, in which the payment’s 
value falls below the club’s benefit from the entrant’s mitigation but exceeds the entrant’s abatement 
cost. The reluctant nations are assumed to become members if their payoff inside the club is greater 
than outside as free-riders. As for the enthusiastic club founders, they stay in the club even if 
 17 
unilateral withdrawal would benefit them and abandon it only if staying generates negative net 
private benefits compared to the scenario without any club at all. The model itself is built on 
empirical data of 141 actors’ (the EU is modeled as a single actor) GDPs, emissions, vulnerabilities 
to climate change, and populations. Moreover, it assumes that the club members are obligated to 
undertake abatement for the worth of a uniform percentage of their GDP. (ibid pp. 915–916). The 
study’s results regarding the potential of climate clubs based on side-payments are rather optimistic. 
In particular, Sælen demonstrates that side-payments have the highest potential in generating club 
growth compared to other instruments, including club goods or conditional commitments. He 
explains that the reason for the “relative effectiveness” of side-payments is that they are targeted 
only at prospective entrants, whereas mechanisms like club goods benefit members and 
nonmembers alike. More specifically, Sælen finds that the largest economies can, sometimes even 
individually, use side-payments to attract large sets of members that cover a substantial share of 
emissions. The scale of the side-payments needed depends on the size of the club as well as on which 
of the members contribute to the payments, the value of which ranges from tens to hundreds of 
billions of US dollars annually. If new members would take part in funding the side-payments, the 
club could reach “virtually universal participation” for “moderate abatement cost-benefit ratios,” but 
in large clubs, the coordination problem among members grows in significance. Furthermore, the 
results indicate that side-payments would unlikely be enough to induce the richest countries to join 
if they were reluctant, even if transfers to the wealthier countries were allowed. This makes it crucial 
for rich nations to be on the enthusiastic side. (ibid pp. 926–927). Given these points, it appears that 
the use of side-payments could enable a climate club to substantially reduce global emissions, at least 
if wealthy large emitters were the club initiators.  
However, as with trade sanctions, political feasibility may arise as a major obstacle for side-
payments (ibid p. 927). Sælen acknowledges that the figures needed for an effective side-payment 
scheme would “likely be politically extremely challenging to muster,” but he also points out that 
developed nations have already committed to collectively mobilizing billions of US dollars for climate 
change mitigation. Another issue is that some of the arrangements found to be successful in the 
model might in truth be hindered by external conflicts between countries. (ibid). Falkner (2016) 
presents additional skepticism toward relying on financial transfers as incentives in climate 
agreements (p. 93). After recognizing the prevalence of financial aid mechanisms in international 
environmental politics, including in the UNFCCC, he argues that their effect on global emissions has 
so far been “negligible.” That is, the payments typically flown from developed countries to emerging 
economies have failed to roll back emissions in the developing nations. Falkner notes that while 
channeling the payments through smaller clubs could enable better targeted aid, he finds it unlikely 
that the contributor countries would be motivated enough to pay for significant abatement efforts in 
the Global South’s largest emitters, who are also major economic competitors. He thus deems the 
role of financial transfers to be small in international climate change mitigation. (ibid). For the most 
part, it seems that side-payments could theoretically be a very potential instrument for incentivizing 
reluctant nations to join a climate club. Whether they would be implementable in the real world 
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depends on the countries’ political willingness to commit to financially contributing the sums needed 
for an effective climate club scheme. In summary, if there are significant asymmetries between 
countries and the obstacles of political feasibility are resolved, Sælen’s analysis suggests that a club 
could reach a wide coverage of global emissions for a moderate scale of side-payments, especially if 
large economies would be the initiators and recruited members would also participate in funding the 
subsequent transfers. 
3.5 Summary of Findings                
To recap this discussion on the possible incentives to be used in climate clubs, both theory 
and various simulation models suggest that club goods, sanctions, and side-payments might indeed 
be successful in inducing effective climate cooperation. The arguments in the literature diverge, 
however, when it comes to the question of which instruments would be most effective. Whereas 
Nordhaus (2015) maintains that sanctions would be necessary to incentivize participation in 
ambitious climate policy and demonstrates in a game-theoretic model that modest trade penalties 
combined with a sufficiently low target carbon price would be enough to attain an effective climate 
club, the agent-based model by Hovi et al. (2017) suggests that club goods reinforced by conditional 
commitments would likely produce clubs with broad coverage of global emissions. By contrast, 
Sælen’s (2016) simulations indicate that the use of side-payments could generate substantial club 
growth with even higher potential than club goods or conditional commitments, as the monetary 
transfers accrue specifically to prospective entrants. All these results are, of course, dependent on 
assumptions and conditions that may or may not hold in the real world. In particular, scholars have 
raised doubts about the political obstacles that might obstruct the implementation of theoretically 
potential climate club proposals. To address these concerns, the following section delves deeper into 
the important questions of the club approach’s feasibility.  
 
4. FEASIBILITY CONCERNS AND RELATION TO THE UN CLIMATE CONVENTION 
 
Regardless of how effective the minilateral proposals might appear in theory and empirical 
simulation models, a climate club approach can only make a difference in international climate 
cooperation if it can actually be implemented. It is thus crucial to explore how scholars have 
addressed concerns over the feasibility of climate clubs. To shed more light on the more practical 
matters of climate club implementation, this section tackles the political obstacles of climate club 
formation as well as the club’s possible relation to the multilateral negotiations under the UNFCCC.  
4.1 Design Features to Increase Political Legitimacy  
 When it comes to the feasibility of climate clubs, a central concern that arises is their potential 
lack of political legitimacy. To clarify, minilateral approaches to international climate negotiations 
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tend to suffer from low public support and thereby from governmental reluctance to engage in club-
based climate cooperation, as Gampfer (2016) explains (p. 63). In his analysis of minilateralism’s 
feasibility, Gampfer emphasizes the importance of domestic political support in the successful 
implementation of climate clubs. Public support is pivotal because voters’ preferences are shown to 
have a significant influence on environmental governance, especially on climate policy decisions, 
which can very directly affect the consumption and lifestyle choices of citizens. Furthermore, 
democratically elected governments will choose to pursue the kind of climate governance 
architecture that in citizens’ opinion provide their national economies benefits commensurate to the 
costs, a fact particularly pertinent in developing countries that “strive to balance goals of 
environmental sustainability, poverty reduction, and economic development.” (ibid pp. 63–64). 
Internal political support is, therefore, a crucial factor in the prospects of a climate club’s success. As 
for the determinants of domestic feasibility, political legitimacy is essential (ibid p. 64). Gampfer 
defines political legitimacy through two concepts, distinguishing between procedural and outcome 
legitimacy. Whereas procedural legitimacy stems from “normatively desirable characteristics of the 
governance process,” such as the rights and obligations of participants and the fair distribution of 
economic and political burdens, outcome legitimacy refers to the “problem-solving performance” of 
the treaty, which in this context means how effectively the agreement can mitigate climate change. 
According to Gampfer, the reasons for minilateralism’s low support can be summarized in four main 
points: First, he argues that climate clubs would lack the procedural-legal legitimacy that the 
UNFCCC has as part of the United Nations system. Indeed, the UN is considered to be the “default 
venue for cooperating on global problems” by the international community, and removing the 
climate negotiation process from its system would risk losing the legitimacy brought on by the 
universal organization. The second reason is that a club approach would place the economic burden 
of mitigation only on the members while the benefits would accrue to all nations regardless of 
participation, which would likely provoke resistance from the populations of cooperating countries. 
Thirdly, Gampfer identifies fear of placing the country’s industries at a comparative disadvantage 
(due to being subject to stricter environmental regulation and higher energy costs than non-
participants) as another reason for opposition among prospective member nations. The final reason 
has to do with the coalition’s effectiveness in mitigating climate change: if the club failed to achieve 
substantial abatement, it would likely gain low support from members and non-members alike. (ibid 
pp. 64–65). Given these points, a climate club would have to overcome a number of potential barriers 
to achieve political legitimacy, a precondition for its successful implementation. Although Gampfer 
highlights the initial lack of public support for minilateral climate governance, he also notes that this 
legitimacy deficit could be alleviated by varying the club’s design (ibid p. 62). Identifying the design 
features that can effectively shift voters’ preferences in favor of minilateral negotiations is therefore 
crucial to gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the potential of the climate club approach.   
To investigate the influence of different design elements on the political feasibility of climate 
clubs, Gampfer conducts conjoint experiments with population samples in the United States and 
India, titled as “the world’s largest democracies” and “two crucial players in international climate 
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politics” (ibid p. 66). His study consists of two representative surveys, one from each country, and 
considers the impacts of the following agreement design features: share of the global emissions 
covered, nature of the emission reduction commitments, membership benefits, and sanctions on 
non-members. Based on theory, Gampfer anticipates the emissions coverage to be a crucial factor in 
the club’s expected success, as political research suggests that voters might sometimes be willing to 
allow procedural legitimacy deficiencies in exchange for increased effectiveness. He thus 
hypothesizes that increasing the share of global emissions regulated under the club scheme would 
lead to higher support for the minilateral approach in prospective member and non-member 
countries alike. (ibid pp. 66–67). The results provide some support for this hypothesis, but only in 
the case where the United States participates in the club: while increasing the regulated emission 
share generates greater support when US membership is likely, respondents care little about the 
club’s effectiveness if the US does not cooperate. As for the findings in India, the emissions coverage 
had no significant impact on the respondents’ opinions. According to Gampfer, these results imply 
that voters’ opposition to climate clubs is not likely to be mitigated by high effectiveness (ibid p. 81). 
The next design feature under consideration is the commitment nature, or more precisely, the 
question of which of the members would adopt binding mitigation commitments. As a matter of 
burden distribution, the answer to this question can be expected to notably impact the public’s 
opinion of minilateralism. Gampfer anticipates that support for the climate club approach will be 
higher if every member country has to commit to reducing emissions, especially so in prospective 
member nations. (ibid p. 66). However, the results of his study suggest that universal commitments 
have a weaker effect on public support than expected. While the support in India remained largely 
the same across various commitment structures, Americans were shown to prefer universal 
commitments but significantly so only in the proposals where US membership was unlikely. It thus 
seems that burden-sharing within the club is not a major determinant of climate club approval in 
prospective member nations after all. (ibid p. 82).  
In addition to the regulated emissions share and commitment nature, Gampfer analyzes the 
impact of member benefits and non-member disadvantages. As it turns out, club goods and sanctions 
affect not only the expected effectiveness of climate clubs but also the public support for the 
approach. Access to membership benefits should increase both the outcome legitimacy (by 
incentivizing greater participation and honoring of the commitments) and procedural legitimacy (as 
members would be compensated for taking on the mitigation burden) and could therefore lead to 
higher support for minilateralism in prospective member countries. Of course, the strength of the 
incentive in a given country would depend on the club good’s perceived value in relation to the 
abatement costs. In any event, Gampfer hypothesizes that support for the climate club approach in 
prospective member nations would rise if membership benefits were provided, increasing with the 
value of such benefits. (ibid p. 66). The results do not entirely attest to the club goods’ expected 
impact, however. Rather, the experiment suggests that the availability of membership benefits does 
not significantly influence respondents’ views on climate clubs, which might reflect reservations 
regarding the value of the club goods. As citizens of a country that is unlikely to be on the receiving 
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end of climate finance and already enjoys rather low global trade barriers, American respondents 
may expect to see little value in the offered club goods; on the other hand, neither does the existence 
of club goods notably affect the responses in India. Moreover, these findings support the assessments 
of other scholars who believe that there exist no club goods valuable enough to induce significant 
abatement from major emitters. (ibid p. 82). The findings on penalizing noncooperative nations are 
similar. While Gampfer expects that imposing disadvantages on non-members would increase the 
public support in prospective member countries and conversely lower the support in likely non-
member countries, the effect increasing with the severity of the disadvantages, he finds their impact 
to be insignificant in both directions (ibid p. 67 & 83). Although it seems that neither member 
benefits nor non-member disadvantages by themselves are valuable enough to notably influence the 
public opinion on minilateralism, Gampfer’s results show that when used in combination, club goods 
and sanctions do increase support for a club approach. In fact, a club model in which various 
exclusive benefits are offered to members and disadvantages imposed on non-members gathers the 
highest support of all agreement types, including the current UNFCCC approach. The important 
implication for climate club design is thus that the agreement architecture should include “both 
sticks for outsiders and carrots for members” to increase public support and thereby the political 
feasibility of minilateralism. (ibid p. 83). However, other scholars have raised doubts about the 
international political feasibility of these agreement features. Club goods and sanctions linked to 
international trade, in particular, would likely be challenged by reluctant nations on the grounds of 
conflicting with global trade law, as Falkner (2016) points out (see the earlier section on incentive 
structure). Nevertheless, when it comes to domestic political support, it appears that a climate club 
proposal would have the greatest prospects of success by incorporating both membership benefits 
and penalties for non-participation. To sum up, careful structural design is needed to ensure not only 
incentive compatibility but also the political feasibility of the club, so that the approach would be 
both effective in mitigating climate change and implementable in the real world.  
4.2 A Climate Club’s Role in the Current Negotiation Landscape  
Also an important question is the climate club’s relation to the UNFCCC, the primary forum 
for international climate negotiations. While some scholars suggest that the club should replace the 
UN convention, others envision the coalition merely but importantly complementing it (Weischer et 
al., 2012, p. 178). Despite its critical flaws, the UNFCCC undeniably has its advantages. To begin 
with, the UNFCCC is “the one official forum where every country has a voice,” which ensures it is 
accepted as legitimate. Secondly, it would be “rather short-sighted” to discard its set of institutions 
that have achieved results and taken many years to create, not to mention how difficult and time-
consuming establishing parallel institutions would be. Thirdly, the UN provides a multilateral 
platform that is crucial to negotiations on global ambition and equity of climate change mitigation, 
in which every country has a stake. For these reasons, Weischer et al. (2012) argue that the climate 
club would be more effective as a complementary forum rather than a replacement for the UN 
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convention, which they deem still necessary for coordination among the larger set of nations. (ibid 
p. 191). Victor (2011) agrees in a sense, proposing that the UNFCCC should “remain as an umbrella 
under which many global efforts unfold” (p. 25). Nonetheless, he believes that ambitious climate 
change mitigation would have to begin in smaller climate clubs that would eventually expand. 
Without criticizing the UN per se, he argues that the institution’s style of diplomacy is structured in 
a way unsuitable for managing the problem of global warming: in his words, the “open, global forum” 
is not equipped to “deliver much leverage” on greenhouse gas emissions in either the enthusiastic or 
the reluctant countries. Moreover, Victor asserts that governments are at fault in their protection of 
the “UN monopoly on climate diplomacy,” making a case f0r diversity and competition in all areas 
of the international effort to mitigate climate change. Namely, he emphasizes that monopolies are 
especially treacherous when the best strategy is unidentified, as is the case with global climate 
governance. Transforming the monopolistic role of the UN platform to that of an umbrella institution 
for various experimental efforts would enable the successful strategies to attract more resources and 
the others to wither. In Victor’s vision, this type of competition would make the UNFCCC itself more 
effective. (ibid p. 26). As can be seen, Victor (2011) advocates for more competitive roles for the 
climate club and the UNFCCC than Weischer et al. (2012), who envision a complementary 
relationship between the forums. Both agree that the climate club should not replace the UNFCCC, 
nonetheless. Based on their analysis, it seems that the optimal solution would be a coexistence of the 
club approach and the UN system, one where the international community would benefit from the 
advantages of both multilateral and minilateral climate policy. In essence, ambitious mitigation 
would arise from the effective incentives created in climate clubs, while the UN convention would 
provide a legitimate, universal forum for global discussions.  
 Of course, the world is a long way from adopting a minilateral approach to international 
climate negotiations. There are several obstacles hindering progress towards more effective climate 
policies, including the political influence of anti-environmental interests, free-riding of nations who 
seek only their own benefit, and the short-sightedness of governments who neglect the interests of 
the future, not to mention the ineffective incentive structure of the UNFCCC that fails to resolve these 
issues (Nordhaus, 2020). An important yet largely unexplored question is, therefore, how might a 
climate club get started? Nordhaus (2015) admits that there exists no clear answer to this question, 
as international regimes “evolve in unpredictable ways” (pp. 1351–1352). For Nordhaus, it seems to 
be enough to have the destination of the climate club clearly defined and acknowledge that “there 
are many roads to get there” (ibid). Weischer et al. (2012) do not speculate about the particulars 
either but note that initiating a transformative climate club will require “the political will of some 
pioneer countries to try it out and lead the way” (p. 192). The minilateral approach clearly breaks 
away significantly from the established UN model of negotiations, and taking on the role of a pioneer 
would be no small task. Yet, exactly that kind of boldness is needed when conventional diplomacy 
fails to yield results.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The climate club approach to international climate change negotiations promises to produce 
an effective agreement that the UNFCCC has failed to attain. The question this thesis aims to answer 
is whether or not this promise can be delivered–could a club of nations achieve a greater reduction 
in global emissions than the unilateral negotiations conducted under the agency of the United 
Nations? The main argument behind the minilateral proposals is founded on the microeconomic 
theory of clubs: to summarize, a club in economics is a group of actors deriving benefits from sharing 
the costs of producing a public good. In a climate club, a group of countries would commit to 
ambitious climate change mitigation (a global public good) and provide incentives to induce 
participation and compliance. In essence, the club mechanism would shift the cost-benefit 
calculations of nations such that joining the club would be more attractive than free-riding outside 
of it. Scholars have proposed various incentive structures for the club, ranging from member benefits 
and non-member penalties to side-payments, and I attempt to uncover which incentives would carry 
the highest potential for building an effective climate club.   
Based on the literature reviewed, I conclude that a club approach could indeed generate more 
effective climate change mitigation than the UNFCCC. As for the potential of different incentive 
options, theory and findings from simulation models yield varying results. For example, Nordhaus 
(2015) comes to show in a game-theoretic model that a combination of trade sanctions and target 
carbon pricing can lead to significant mitigation, while a club without penalties for non-participation 
will dissolve into the non-cooperative, low-abatement equilibrium. Hovi et al. (2017), on the other 
hand, find an incentive structure with both club goods and conditional commitments to have a high 
potential for achieving effective coverage of global emissions. In contrast, Sælen (2016) argues that 
side-payments would work more effectively than instruments like club goods since the transfers 
accrue exclusively to prospective entrants. His results also suggest that large economies could induce 
broad participation through side-payments, especially if recruited member nations would also 
contribute to the payments and large economies were the club initiators. As can be seen, no single 
incentive option rises above the others in the literature but rather, many different proposals are 
shown to have potential. While there exists no consensus regarding the most effective club design, a 
common conclusion is that a club mechanism could indeed generate significant abatement levels. Of 
course, the success of any club structure would depend on the feasibility of its implementation. The 
feasibility of climate tariffs, in particular, has been questioned: potentially in conflict with current 
international trade principals, they are feared to induce retaliation by non-participant nations and 
lead to escalating protectionism. However, scholars have proposed ways to work around the 
potential legal issues with trade sanctions or benefits, suggesting that certain GATT articles would 
legitimate them and that climate amendments should be added to international trade law. Political 
feasibility presents another potential obstacle for the club approach. Although it appears that 
minilateralism suffers from weak public support and low political legitimacy, Gampfer’s (2016) 
results also indicate that certain club design configurations (namely, a combination of various club 
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goods and sanctions) can increase the political feasibility of the approach. Clearly, it would be 
important for the climate club’s design to be optimized not only for effectiveness in mitigation but 
also for legal and political feasibility. Another relevant question concerns the club’s prospective role 
in the current climate negotiations landscape. Based on the arguments of Weischer et al. (2012) and 
Victor (2011), a complementary relation between the climate club and the UNFCCC would seem 
optimal. Rather than replacing the UN system, the climate club is envisioned as a supplementary 
approach that would generate effective mitigation through a more robust incentive structure, while 
the UNFCCC would continue to provide a legitimate platform for universal negotiations. In 
conclusion, the literature indicates that a climate club’s prospective potential for generating effective 
climate change mitigation is high, provided that the club’s incentives are successfully designed to 
induce the needed participation and to achieve political feasibility.    
Granted, the findings in this paper are subject to a number of limitations. First of all, since 
no climate club exists as of yet, all the results regarding the approach’s potential are founded solely 
on theory and simulation models. While the models incorporate real-world data and offer valuable 
insight into a club’s prospects, they are of course built on simplifications and assumptions that may 
or may not hold in reality. Moreover, it is important to note that the perspective of economics leaves 
many critical questions unanswered, and more comprehensive legal and political analysis is needed 
to determine whether a club mechanism could be an effective solution to the problems of 
international climate negotiations. All in all, the climate club approach deserves more research by 
scholars of different disciplines as well as attention from policymakers. The international community 
is in a pressing need of effective cooperation on climate change, and the theoretical potential of the 
club model is too high for the approach to be disregarded.  
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